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S U M M A R Y
Objectives: An Austrian boarding school reported a cluster of gastroenteritis on January 10,
2014. Environmental swabs from the school cafeteria and a nearby kebab restaurant tested positive
for norovirus. The outbreak was investigated to identify its source(s).
Methods: An outbreak case was deﬁned as a student or staff member with diarrhoea or vomiting that
developed between January 7 and 13. Details on food exposure were collected via a self-administered
questionnaire; risk ratios (RR) and 95% conﬁdence intervals (CI) were calculated. Norovirus from the
stool specimens of cases and asymptomatic kebab restaurant workers were genotyped.
Results: Twenty-eight cases were identiﬁed among 144 persons (attack rate 19%). The outbreak emerged
and peaked on January 9, and ended on January 12. Compared to those who did not eat kebab, those who
ate kebab on 7, 8, and 9 January were respectively 11 (95% CI 4.2–28), 6.7 (95% CI 3.4–13), and 9.3 (95% CI
4.0–22) times more likely to develop disease within the following 2 days. Stool specimens from three
cases and three restaurant workers were positive for norovirus GII.P21.
Conclusions: The kebab prepared by norovirus-positive restaurant workers was the most likely source of
the outbreak. It is recommended that food handlers comply strictly with hand hygiene and avoid bare-
handed contact with ready-to-eat food to minimize the risk of food-borne infection.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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jou r nal h o mep ag e: w ww .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate / i j id1. Introduction
A meta-analysis published in 2014 suggests that norovirus (NV)
causes almost a ﬁfth of all cases of acute gastroenteritis
worldwide.1 Genogroups I, II, and IV, including at least 25 geno-
types, are responsible for human infections.2,3 The infectious dose
is approximately 18 to 1000 viral particles. Thus, NV is highly
contagious. Transmission takes place through faecal–oral route,
aerosol–vomitus route, or contact with contaminated food, water,
or environment. The incubation period ranges from 10 to 51 h,
with most cases occurring at between 24 and 48 h after
exposure.1,2
Since 2005, food-borne NV illness has been notiﬁable in Austria.
The Austrian public health authorities reported 54 NV outbreaks in
2010, 32 in 2011, 16 in 2012, and 26 in 2013.4,5 The dominant
strain was GII.P4 New Orleans 2009 during 2010–2012, and the
new strain GII.4 Sydney 2012 in 2013.4* Corresponding author. Tel.: +43 (0)50 555 37304; fax: +43 (0)50 555 37109.
E-mail address: daniela.schmid@ages.at (D. Schmid).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2015.05.021
1201-9712/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).On January 10, 2014, the school director of a boarding school in
Carinthia, Austria informed the provincial public health ofﬁce
about a cluster of vomiting and diarrhoea involving 19 students,
which occurred on January 9 and 10. Environmental swabs taken
from the serving hatch of the school cafeteria tested positive for NV
using RT-PCR on January 11. Based on this result, food inspectors
closed the school cafeteria for cleaning and disinfection on that
day. Stool samples obtained from all 10 school kitchen workers,
who had no gastrointestinal symptoms, tested negative for
Shigella, Salmonella, Campylobacter, and enterohaemorrhagic
Escherichia coli by culture, and negative for NV by real-time RT-
PCR. On January 13, the provincial public health ofﬁcer interviewed
the 19 students and found that at least half of them had eaten
kebab in a nearby kebab restaurant 1–2 days before the onset of
illness. The food inspector examined the kebab restaurant and
collected specimens from typical kebab ingredients, such as
lettuce, onion, and tomato, and from 11 environmental swabs
(ﬁve from the pizza oven, six from the dishwashing area), which
were tested in the provincial food safety laboratory. On January 14,
the inspector closed the kebab restaurant because one of ﬁve
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Figure 1. Distribution of dates of onset of probable outbreak cases in a boarding school, and public health responses by the provincial public health authority, Carinthia,
Austria, January 7–16, 2014 (n = 28).
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provincial public health ofﬁcer mandated the Austrian Agency for
Health and Food Safety (AGES) to investigate the outbreak in order
to assess its magnitude, identify the source(s), and to propose
preventive measures.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Descriptive epidemiology
A probable outbreak case was deﬁned as any student or staff
member at the boarding school with the onset of diarrhoea or
vomiting during the period January 7–13. Those whose stool
specimens were positive for NV were considered conﬁrmed
outbreak cases.
To search for cases and to collect additional information, the
provincial public health ofﬁcer distributed self-administered
questionnaires to all students and members of staff on January
15; the following information was collected: age, sex, boarding
status, clinical symptoms, and time of symptom onset. The
outbreak was described by person, place, and time.
2.2. Analytical epidemiology
A retrospective cohort study was conducted among the school
students and staff. The students and kitchen workers provided
information on the consumption of food in the school cafeteria andat the local kebab restaurant between January 7 and 10, using a
self-administered questionnaire. Attack rates were calculated by
age, sex, and date (January 7–10). For food exposures on January 7,
8, 9, and 10, day-speciﬁc cohorts were established with
participants who had remained disease-free up to that speciﬁc
day. The number of cases within the following 2 days was divided
by the day-speciﬁc denominator to calculate the day-speciﬁc
attack rate (AR). For each speciﬁc day (January 7, 8, 9, and 10), those
who ate school food or kebab were compared with those who did
not through the calculation of risk ratios (RR), the 95% conﬁdence
intervals (CI), and the population attributable fractions (PAF%). The
analysis was stratiﬁed to identify effect modiﬁcations and
confounding between kebab consumption, school food consump-
tion, and boarding school attendance using bivariate exact Poisson
regression, setting the signiﬁcance level at 0.05. Data were entered
into Epi Info software version 7 and all statistical analyses were
conducted using Stata version 12.
2.3. Laboratory and environmental investigations
The NV reference centre in AGES tested stool specimens from
three outbreak cases and three food handlers at the kebab
restaurant for NV by real-time RT-PCR and performed sequence-
based genotyping as described elsewhere.6,7 Viral RNA from the
NV-positive environmental swabs, obtained from the pizza oven
and dishwashing area in the kebab restaurant, was sent to the
Consultant Laboratory for Norovirus in Germany for genotyping.
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3.1. Descriptive epidemiology
Twenty-eight students and members of staff met the probable
outbreak case deﬁnition; three of these were laboratory-
conﬁrmed cases. All probable outbreak cases were male students,
with a median age of 16 years (range 14–17 years). Twenty-six
(93%) had nausea, 21 (75%) abdominal pain, 20 (71%) vomiting,
and 19 (68%) diarrhoea. All had consumed school food and 18
(64%) reported the consumption of kebab at a local kebab
restaurant within 48 h prior to onset. The cases emerged and
peaked on January 9 and no further cases were reported after
January 12 (Figure 1).
3.2. Analytical epidemiology
Among 138 students and 22 members of staff at the boarding
school, 144 replied to the questionnaires (response 90%). The
overall attack rate among the 144 participants (121 students and
23 staff-members) was 19% (28/144). The attack rate was highest
among student participants aged 16 years (33%), followed by those
aged 17, 14, and 15 years (23%, 18%, and 17%, respectively).
Students who lived in the dorms were more likely to have
symptoms compared to those who did not live in the dorms
(boarding school attendance: RR 5.0, 95% CI 2.0–12). The day-
speciﬁc attack rates during January 7–10 were 9%, 15%, 10%, and
5%, respectively.
Compared to those who did not eat kebab, those who ate kebab
on January 7 (RR 11, 95% CI 4.2–28), January 8 (RR 6.7, 95% CI 3.4–
13), and January 9 (RR 9.3, 95% CI 4.0–22) were more likely to haveTable 1
Day-speciﬁc attack rates and risk ratios by food items in a boarding school in Carinthi
Date Food items Exposed 
Cases Total A
Jan 7 (n = 144) Kebab 7 14 5
School food 13 126 1
Jan 8 (n = 144) Kebab 10 16 6
School food 22 124 1
Jan 9 (n = 131) Kebab 4 6 6
School food 13 113 1
Jan 10 (n = 122) Kebab 0 2 
School food 5 97 
AR, attack rate; RR, risk ratio; CI, conﬁdence interval; NC, not calculable.
Table 2
Day-speciﬁc risk ratios of eating school food, stratiﬁed by kebab exposure, in a boardin
Date Ate kebab Did not eat keba
RR of school food (95% CI) p-Value RR of school foo
Jan 7 NC - 1.31 (0.18–1) 
Jan 8 0.93 (0.15–1) 1.0 2.93 (0.48–1) 
Jan 9 NC - 2.10 (0.33–1) 
Jan 10 NC - 1.32 (0.15–62) 
RR, risk ratio; CI, conﬁdence interval; NC, not calculable.
Table 3
Crude and adjusted risk ratios of boarding school attendance among the student partic
Date Crude RR of boarding school attendance (95% CI) p-Value 
Jan 7 3.6 (0.93–20) 0.067 
Jan 8 4.9 (1.6–20) <0.01 
Jan 9 15 (2.2–620) <0.01 
Jan 10 7.0 (0.78–330) 0.10 
RR, risk ratio; CI, conﬁdence interval; NC, not calculable.
a Adjusted for kebab consumption.had the symptoms within the following 2 days. Among the
participants who ate kebab on January 7, 8, and 9, 91%, 85%, and
89% of the cases, respectively, could be attributed to kebab
(attributable risk percentage). Among the day-speciﬁc cohort, 49%
of the cases could be attributed to eating kebab on January 7, 39% to
eating kebab on January 8, and 28% to eating kebab on January 9
(day-speciﬁc population attributable risk percentage). Overall,
among the total cohort, 72% could be attributed to eating kebab
(total population attributable risk percentage). Eating kebab or
school food on January 10 was not associated with being a case
(Table 1). Among the participants who ate kebab, eating school
food on January 8 was not associated with being an outbreak case
(RR 0.93, 95% CI 0.15–1). All those who ate kebab on January 7, 9,
and 10, also ate school food on the same day. Among the
participants who did not eat kebab, eating school food during
January 7–10 was not associated with being a case either, showing
that kebab consumption was not an effect modiﬁer (Table 2).
Boarding school attendance was no longer signiﬁcantly associated
with illness when adjusted for kebab consumption, except for
January 9 (Table 3), which revealed that kebab consumption was
probably a confounder between outbreak cases and boarding
school attendance.
3.3. Laboratory and environmental investigations
Stool specimens from three outbreak cases and three food
handlers of the kebab restaurant were positive for NV GII.P21. No
food leftovers from the kebab restaurant or school cafeteria were
available for testing. Due to poor transport conditions, the viral
RNA from the NV-positive environmental swabs was not available
for genotyping.a, Austria; January 7–10, 2014
Non-exposed RR (95% CI)
R% Cases Total AR%
0% 6 130 5% 11 (4.2–28)
0% 0 18 0% NC
3% 12 128 9% 6.7 (3.4–13)
8% 0 20 0% NC
7% 9 125 7% 9.3 (4.0–22)
2% 0 18 0% NC
0% 6 120 5% 0
5% 1 25 4% 1.3 (0.16–11)
g school in Carinthia, Austria; January 7–10, 2014
b Crude
d (95% CI) p-Value RR of school food (95% CI) p-Value
0.82 2.61 (0.44–1) 0.35
0.29 5.04 (0.88–1) 0.07
0.49 2.91 (0.49–1) 0.29
1.0 1.29 (0.14–61) 1.0
ipants in the boarding school in Carinthia, Austria; January 7–10, 2014
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A 4-day NV outbreak among boarding school students in
Carinthia, Austria, in January 2014, was investigated; this
outbreak was most likely associated with the consumption of
kebab from a nearby local kebab restaurant. Kebab is usually
made of vegetables and grilled meat, wrapped in a ﬂat bread
(pita). The meat and pita are heated thoroughly before being
served. Lettuce, onion, and tomato are added after the heating
process and are therefore virologically plausible vehicles for NV.
Day-speciﬁc cohort analyses were applied by establishing day-
speciﬁc study cohorts and cases to calculate food-speciﬁc attack
rates day by day. This approach minimizes the chance of
misclassiﬁcation of cases, especially when an NV outbreak is
caused by different day-speciﬁc point sources. As only less than
half of the cases among the participants could be attributed to
kebab consumption, food from the school kitchen served on
January 7–10 was considered another source of this outbreak. NV
outbreaks due to multiple point sources, followed by person-
to-person or environmental transmission, have been reported
previously.8,9
Interviews with the food handlers at the kebab restaurant
further revealed that a food handler’s daughter, who was not
attending the affected boarding school, had experienced similar
gastrointestinal symptoms prior to the outbreak. In addition, the
provincial public health ofﬁcer was informed about several
students from another school near the kebab restaurant who
had suffered from nausea and vomiting around the same time
when the outbreak occurred. These facts, even though mostly
hearsay, support our conclusion of the outbreak source.
The food inspector closed the school cafeteria on January 11,
after environmental swabs from the surface of a serving hatch
tested positive for NV. The contamination most likely occurred by
outbreak case-students, who continued to eat in the cafeteria. If
these case-students had been excluded from the school until at
least 48 h after symptom relief, secondary transmissions could
have been prevented.10 The kebab restaurant was closed on
January 14. Both ofﬁcial interventions were based on microbio-
logical ﬁndings and took place before the results of the present
epidemiological investigations were available. However, the
epidemiological evidence justiﬁed the closure of the kebab
restaurant.
Sequence-based genotyping of NV detected in stool specimens
from six outbreak cases and three presumably asymptomatic food
handlers at the kebab restaurant showed an identical genotype,
GII.P21. Among all subtyped NV in 2008–2013, about 10% were
GII.P21 in 2008 and <5% in 2009, 2010, and 2011. NV GII.P21 was
not identiﬁed in 2012 or 2013.5
Neither retained food specimens nor leftovers were available
from the kebab restaurant, and specimens collected from
unrelated food tested negative for NV. However, this does not
exclude kebab as the source of the outbreak, as strong epidemio-
logical evidence was provided by the cohort study. The detection of
NV in food remains challenging for laboratories due to low virus
titres in contaminated food and detection-inhibiting food matri-
ces.2,11,12 The NV strain found in the presumably asymptomatic
kitchen workers at the kebab restaurant was indistinguishable
from that of the outbreak cases, which led to the suspicion that the
kitchen workers were the likely reservoir of the outbreak. NV
found on the surfaces of the pizza oven and dishwashing area of the
kebab restaurant indicates a violation of the hand hygiene
regulations by these kitchen workers. Due to poor specimen
transport conditions, the NV of these surfaces was not available for
comparative strain analyses.13
Asymptomatic food handlers have been reported repeatedly as
the sources of NV outbreaks.14–18 A study in Japan suggested thatmean viral loads of NV among asymptomatic individuals are
similar to those of symptomatic individuals.19,20 According to the
Austrian food safety regulations, symptomatic NV-positive food
handlers should stop working until at least 48 h after symptom
relief. However, this regulation cannot prevent asymptomatic food
handlers from working and contaminating food by NV shedding.
Furthermore, since NV is a non-enveloped virus, resulting in a high
environmental tenacity, usual hand hygiene practices and surface
disinfection cannot prevent NV from entering food preparation
areas.2,21 The continuous use of NV effective hand and surface
disinfectants in food preparation areas might not be feasible.
Nevertheless, it is important to raise food handlers’ awareness of
the possible continued contamination of food with NV at >48 h
following symptom relief and even when exposed to symptomatic
NV-infected persons.22 Advising food handlers on the use of NV
effective hand disinfectants for up to 3 weeks after symptom relief
might be a practicable preventive measure. In addition, all food
handlers should be encouraged to use clean gloves while handling
ready-to-eat food.10
A limitation of this investigation was that the questioning did
not obtain information on the ingredients of the kebab or
individual food items of the boarding school lunch and dinner.
This made analyses with school lunch and dinner food items
impossible and thus food items prepared in the school kitchen may
have been missed as outbreak sources.
It is concluded that kebab prepared by the NV-positive food
handlers in the local kebab restaurant was at least one source of
this NV outbreak. Ofﬁcial measures based on early available
microbiological ﬁndings, before epidemiological evidence for the
outbreak source is available, can be crucial for the timely control of
food-borne NV outbreaks.
It is recommend that (1) symptomatic NV-infected food
handlers comply with the national recommendations, including
exclusion from work for at least 48 h after the resolution of
symptoms; (2) food handlers comply strictly with hand hygiene
measures and avoid bare-handed contact with ready-to-eat food to
minimize the risk of transmission of any food-borne pathogens; (3)
restaurant owners comply with the Austrian legal requirement for
regular food safety and hygiene training of all food handlers,
raising food handlers’ awareness on how NV can enter food
preparation areas; (4) public food safety laboratories establish and
follow the standard operational procedures for food pathogen-
positive specimen transportation.
In our view, this outbreak investigation report impressively
underlines the considerable potential of epidemiological investi-
gations to elucidate the source of an outbreak.23 Without a cohort
study, the school cafeteria could incorrectly have been seen as a
microbiologically conﬁrmed outbreak source, while in fact it was
a ‘victim’ itself. Kebab restaurants are increasingly recognized as a
source of food-borne outbreaks, be it norovirus or salmonella.24
Outbreak investigations, correctly carried out, are therefore a
public health imperative for the evidence-based prevention and
control of food-borne infectious disease.
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